KOLSTAD V. AMERICAN DENTAL Ass 'N: THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaumt
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991 Act") enables victims of
employment discrimination who bring claims under either Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA") to receive compensatory and punitive damages.! Although the
1991 Act caps damages based on the number of employees within an
organization, and stipulates that a litigant may receive a maximum of
$300,000, the availability of punitive damages in employment
discrimination cases has been hotly contested. Traditionally, employees
who brought claims under Title VII were awarded only equitable remedies,
including reinstatement and back pay, which often did not result in a large
monetary awards. By enacting the 1991 Act, Congress sought to create
greater incentives for victims of discrimination to initiate cases by
providing them with additional remedies. Congress also passed the 1991
Act as a preventative measure, to force employers to address the potential
consequences of large liability and to
2 create more effective mechanisms for
eliminating discriminatory conduct.
This transformation of available remedies was met with tremendous
opposition by employers, who have attempted through litigation to limit the
situations in which compensatory and punitive damages are awarded.
When the Supreme Court decided Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n 3 in
June 1999, many employers cheered that the Court had created a
formidable obstacle that would prevent most employees who brought suits
alleging discrimination from receiving punitive damages. In Kolstad, the
t A.B. 1996, Duke University; M.A. in History 1998, University of Pennsylvania;
J.D. 2001, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
I. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (1994). Previously, only equitable
remedies were available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
2. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that,
when analyzing the passage of the 1991 Act, Congress made findings that "additional
remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional
discrimination in the workplace") (citation omitted).
3. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
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Supreme Court held that in order to obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff
needed to show that the defendant had engaged in intentional
discrimination "'with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally
protected rights of an aggrieved individual.' 4 In repudiating several courts
of appeals, the Court emphasized that a plaintiff did not need to show an
egregious act separate from a defendant's culpable state of mind.
However, the Court also modified the agency principles that allowed an
employee to impute the discriminatory actions of an employee agent to his
or her employer. The Court stated that "[a]n employer may not be
vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of
managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer's
'good faith efforts to comply with Title VII."' 5
Many employers have been eager to praise Kolstad, and many
commentators have predicted that the Supreme Court's decision will vastly
reduce punitive damage awards against employers in employment
discrimination cases. In its analysis of the previous Supreme Court term's
prominent cases, the Harvard Law Review (the "Review") stated that, "[b]y
allowing employers to avoid punitive liability for their agents' unlawful
behavior without establishing a clear good-faith-effort standard, the Court
rendered Title VII's most powerful deterrent mechanism-punitive
damages-ineffectual" 6 The Review argued that the Supreme Court's
decision would hinder Congress' primary goal in passing the 1991 Act,
deterrence of discrimination in the workplace. The article stated that since
"individuals are generally not personally liable for punitive damages and
employer vicarious liability for punitive damages has been limited by
Kolstad, few people will be deterred by the threat of punitive damages."7
The piece cited several employment law newsletters written by law firms
which promoted the positive effect that Kolstad would have on reducing
employer liability for punitive damages. One of the newsletters asserted
that "[a]s an employer, you can breathe a bit easier-you don't have to
worry quite as much about large punitive damage awards if you've adopted
and implemented antidiscrimination policies."'
The Federal Litigator agreed with the Review's assessment that the
Kolstad decision would vastly reduce employer liability for punitive
damages. In its analysis of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.
4. Id. at 530 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994)).
5. Id. at 545 (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting)).
6. Leading Cases, Civil Rights Act of 1991-Employer Liabilityfor Punitive Damages
in Title VII Claims, 113 HARV. L. REv. 359, 359-60 (1999) (concluding that the Court's
decision in Kolstad failed to take into account Congress' desire to create "alternative
preventative measures" in addition to the adoption of employer anti-discrimination policies).
7. Id. at 365.
8. Id. at 366 (citations omitted).
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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,9 a Tenth Circuit case that applied the new Kolstad
standard but affirmed the trial court's award of punitive damages, 0 the
article stated that "[i]n commenting on Kolstad, we said that the 'good-faith
effort' defense is likely to make punitive damages more difficult to obtain
in Title VII (and ADA actions). It didn't here, but this doesn't persuade us
to change our prediction.""
Although most commentators have touted the Kolstad standard as the
answer to employers' concerns about punitive damage liability, most of the
cases decided by the federal courts of appeals have not utilized it to bar
punitive damages. Of the eleven circuit courts of appeals that have applied
the Kolstad standard, only the First and Second Circuits have applied it to
limit punitive damage liability in a very narrow set of circumstances. 2 In
addition, some of the courts of appeals have utilized the Kolstad standard to
reverse the limitations that lower courts have placed on punitive damages. 3
This comment examines the impact of the new standard for punitive
damages in employment discrimination cases established by the Supreme
Court in Kolstad. Although the long-term impact of the Kolstad decision is
not completely clear, this comment argues that the Supreme Court's
limitation on employers' vicarious liability will not, as many commentators
have predicted, vastly reduce employers' liability for punitive damages.
The majority of courts that have interpreted Kolstad's good faith standard
have looked beyond whether an employer has a grievance procedure or
anti-discrimination policy in place, and have analyzed whether these
mechanisms were actually effective in redressing and preventing
harassment and discrimination in the workplace.
This comment begins with an analysis of the 1991 Act and then
discusses the various litigation phases of the Kolstad case and the detailed
standard developed by the Supreme Court. The comment then examines
Title VII cases which have applied the Kolstad standard, with an emphasis
on the impact of the new standard on the cases discussed. The piece also
examines the effect of this new standard on the enforcement of other civil
9. 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999).
10. Id. at 1245.
11. Punitive Damages-Employment Discrimination-"GoodFaith Effort" Defense,
14 No. 12 FED. LIGATOR 308, 309 (1999) (suggesting that employers can successfully
raise the good faith effort defense when they have implemented specific anti-discrimination
policies that focus on the requirements of Title VII or the ADA, rather than the general antidiscrimination policy that Wal-Mart had in place).
12. See Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc., 214 F.3d 224, 224 (2d Cir. 2000)
(upholding the district court's refusal to award punitive damages in an ADA case);
Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs § 1983 false
arrest claim did not provide sufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages).
13. See Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999)
(reversing the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs punitive damages claim and remanding
"for the specific purpose of submitting to a jury the issue of punitive damages").
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rights laws and the ability of anti-discrimination laws to achieve their
objectives of deterring discrimination in the workplace.
I.

PuNIvE DAMAGES: THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

Congress borrowed the wording for the punitive damages provision of
the 1991 Act from the Supreme Court's opinion in Smith v. Wade.14 In that
case, the plaintiff, Daniel Wade, an inmate in a youth offender facility,
brought suit under § 19835 against reformatory guards and correctional
officials.16 Wade alleged that the guards violated his Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 17 The District Court
awarded Wade both compensatory and punitive damages against one of the
guards."
The Supreme Court in Smith decided that, "a jury may be
permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under § 1983 when the
defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or
when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected
rights of others."1 9 The standard articulated in Smith has been used by
Congress not only to develop the standard for punitive damages in the 1991
Act, but it also has been used by federal courts 2 to analyze whether
punitive damages should be awarded under other anti-discrimination
statutes such as § 1981.21
The 1991 Act only allows compensatory and punitive damages in
cases of intentional discrimination.2 2 While the 1991 Act allows plaintiffs
bringing suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADA
to receive compensatory and punitive damages, the maximum amount of
damages is capped based on the number of workers employed in the
current or preceding calendar year.23 The Act states:
14. 461 U.S. 30, 34 (1983).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999) (providing an opportunity for individuals to bring civil
actions for the deprivation of their rights under color of state law).
16. Smith, 461 U.S. at 32.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 33.
19. Id. at 56.
20. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 535-36 (1999).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994) (stating that all persons shall have the equal right
"to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens"). Section 1981 was passed in the wake of the Civil War in order to provide
the newly emancipated slaves with federal protection of their civil rights.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994) (stating that compensatory and punitive damages
are not available in disparate impact Title VII cases where the discrimination takes the form
of a neutral policy, and therefore, the employer did not intentionally discriminate).
23. Id. § 1981a(b)(3) (stating that the total amount of compensatory and punitive
damages a plaintiff can receive if an employer employs more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees is $50,000; more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees is $100,000; more than
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A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this
section against a respondent (other than a government,
government agency or political subdivision) if the complaining
party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a
discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or
with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual.24
Congress passed the 1991 Act in order to "strengthen and improve Federal
civil rights laws" by providing additional remedies to civil rights
plaintiffs.25 Although many courts of appeals have interpreted the punitive
damages standard in the 1991 Act, the Supreme Court's first analysis of
this issue came during its October 1998 term when it decided Kolstad.
II.

KOLSTAD V. AMERICAN DENTAL ASS'N

Carole Kolstad was working as the Director of Federal Agency
Relations at the American Dental Association (the "Association") when in
September 1992, Jack O'Donnell announced that he was retiring as both
the Director of Legislation and Legislative Policy and the Director of the
Council on Government Affairs and Federal Dental Services at the end of
the year.26 Both Kolstad and Tom Spangler, the Association's Legislative
Counsel for the previous twenty months, expressed interest in O'Donnell's
position. 27 Kolstad and Spangler had both received "distinguished"
performance evaluations, and had worked directly with O'Donnell. 2s
Although Leonard Wheat, the current head of the Washington office,
had the authority to name O'Donnell's replacement, he requested that Dr.
William Allen, the Association's Executive Director in the main office in
2
Chicago, make the appointmentY.
After a discussion with Wheat, Allen
revised the Position Description Questionnaire for O'Donnell's job to
incorporate many of the job responsibilities included in the questionnaire
used to hire Spangler. 0 In addition, one month after O'Donnell announced
his retirement, Wheat signed Spangler's performance evaluation which
listed "to 'provide management and administrative support... for the
Council on Government Affairs"' as one of Spangler's goals for 1993. ,
These duties included work that was then performed by O'Donnell.
200 and fewer than 501 employees is $200,000; and more than 500 employees is $300,000).
24. Id. U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).
25. H.R. Res. 270, 102nd Cong. (1991).
26. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526,530 (1999).
27. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
28. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 530.
29. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1434.
30. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
31. Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1435.
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Spangler formally applied for the position in November 1992.32 After
communicating to Allen that Wheat had refused to meet with her for
several weeks to discuss her interest in the position, Kolstad also applied.33
Following interviews with both Spangler and Kolstad, Wheat
recommended Spangler for the position.34 Allen then offered the position
to Spangler and he accepted.35 Thereafter, Allen informed Kolstad that she
did not receive the position due to her lack of experience in health care
reform and because she was too valuable in her current position.36
Subsequently, Kolstad filed a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"); and after exhausting her
administrative remedies, filed suit in the District Court for the District of
Columbia.37 Kolstad alleged unlawful employment discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1991 Act.3" She sought
equitable relief including back pay, instatement to the positions of Director
of Legislation and Legislative Policy and Director of the Council on
Government Affairs and Federal Dental Services, attorneys' fees, and
compensatory and punitive damages.3 9

Kolstad tried her claim of back pay to an advisory jury, and her claim
of instatement to the judge. Although the district court denied defendant's
motion for judgment as a matter of law, it dismissed Kolstad's
compensatory and punitive damages claims due to insufficient evidence.40
The jury found that the Association had unlawfully discriminated against
Kolstad on the basis of sex and awarded her $52,718 in damages, exactly
41
the amount she sought in back pay. Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson of
the district court entered judgment against the Association in the amount of
the advisory jury verdict, but refused to grant Kolstad instatement or award
her attorneys' fees.42
Kolstad appealed, challenging both the district court's dismissal of her
compensatory and punitive damages claims and the court's denial of
instatement and attorneys' fees.43 Writing for the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, Judge David Tatel reversed the district court's
decision that denied Kolstad's request for an instruction on punitive

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 912 F. Supp. 13, 13 (D.D.C. 1996).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
Kolstad, 108 F.3d at 1435.
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damages. 44 The court held that the jury could have reasonably found
intentional discrimination and therefore it should have been permitted to
consider awarding punitive damages. 45 The court, citing the 1991 Act's
legislative history, held that a plaintiff need only show malice or reckless
indifference, rather than egregious conduct, in order to receive punitive
damages.46 However, the court did acknowledge that not every case of
intentional discrimination supports a punitive damages award.47 The court
of appeals remanded the case to the district court for a trial on punitive
damages.48
Judge Stephen Williams wrote a separate opinion, in which he
concurred in part and dissented in part.49 Citing the decisions of five other
circuits, Williams argued that the 1991 Act required a more culpable state
of mind for punitive damages than the "ordinary intent" required to sustain
a violation of Title VII.50 Judge Williams also relied on the legislative
history of the 1991 Act and "other measures taken to constrain the award of
punitives" to show that a plaintiff needs to prove more than intentional
discrimination in order to be awarded punitive damages.
Therefore,
Williams did not support the remand to the district court for a trial on
punitive damages.52
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted en
banc review of the decision by the panel. 3 In a divided opinion (six to
five), Judge Williams, this time writing for the majority, concluded that
"before the question of punitive damages can go to the jury, the evidence of
the defendant's culpability must exceed what is needed to show intentional
discrimination. 54 The court held that a plaintiff must prove egregious
misconduct before the jury is allowed to consider a claim for punitive
44. Id. at 1440.
45. Id. at 1438.

46. Id. at 1437 (stating that Congress concluded that "additional remedies under Federal
law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the
workplace") (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 1438 (asserting that "[b]y our decision today, we do not suggest that evidence
sufficient to establish liability under Title VII for intentional discrimination will always
sustain an award of punitive damages under section 1981a").
48. Id. at 1440.
49. Id.

50. Id. at 1440-41 (Williams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (disagreeing with
the proposition that "the minimum standard of evidence for punitive damages is... no
higher than the standard for liability").
51. Id. at 1441-44 (Williams, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS and various state law restrictions on punitive damages,
which require proof of egregious conduct).
52. Id. at 1446.
53. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
54. Id. at 960-61 (rejecting Kolstad's proposed rule which would allow every plaintiff
with a case strong enough to get to the jury to receive punitive damages).
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damages. 5 The en banc majority affirmed the decision of the district court
and held that punitive damages should not have been an issue at trial .

Writing for the en banc dissent, Judge Tatel argued that the majority
opinion nullified the plain language of the 1991 Act by requiring egregious
57

misconduct beyond the culpable state of mind required under the Act.

Judge Tatel also discussed the potential problems that his proposed
standard could create because of the vicarious liability of employers under
general agency principles.5 8 Tatel proposed that an employer might be able
that it had "undertaken
to avoid punitive damages liability if it alleged
'59
good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 6° In a split decision, the

Supreme Court disagreed with the en banc majority of the District of
Columbia Circuit and held that in order to be eligible for punitive damages,

plaintiffs need not show egregious conduct, but must demonstrate a
culpable state of mind, as required by the 1991 Act. 61 However, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion limited the vicarious liability of employers
for punitive damages when the employer has made a good faith effort to

comply with Title VII. 62
In its analysis of what is required in order to receive punitive damages,
63
the Court relied on the standard established by Congress in the 1991 Act.

A plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination by an employer who
engaged in discriminatory practices with malice or reckless indifference to

55. Id. at 965 (finding that the issue of punitive damages should reach the jury when
"the defendant engaged in a pervasive pattern of discriminatory acts, or manifested genuine
spite and malevolence, or otherwise evinced a 'criminal indifference to civil obligations"')
(citations omitted).
56. Id. at 970.
57. Id. at 971 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 974 (Tatel, J., dissenting); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219
(1958) (stating that "[a] master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed
while acting in the scope of their employment").
59. Kolstad, 139 F.3d at 975 (providing several examples of good faith efforts made by
employers in order to comply with Title VII, including "hiring staff and managers sensitive
to Title VII responsibilities .... requiring effective EEO training, or... developing and
using objective hiring and promotion standards," which would demonstrate that the
employer "never acted in reckless disregard of federally protected rights").
60. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 525 U.S. 960 (1998).
61. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 538 (1999). Justice O'Connor wrote
the majority decision in Kolstad. Six justices (Justices Scalia, Breyer, Stevens, Ginsburg,
Souter and Kennedy) signed the part of the opinion that did not require a showing of
egregious conduct. Id. at 526, 547. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas dissented
from this part of the opinion. Id. at 547.
62. Id. at 545. Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices Kennedy and Scalia in this part
of the opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas concurred. Id. at 547. Justice
Stevens dissented, and was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter. Id. at 552.
63. Id. at 534.
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the plaintiff's federally protected rights. 64 The Court determined that
Congress' intent was to impose two standards of liability: one for
establishing a claim for compensatory damages and another, higher
standard in order to qualify for punitive damages.65 The Court emphasized
that the focus of the malice and reckless indifference standard should be on
the intent and mental state of the employer.6 6 The Court stated that "[tihe
terms 'malice' or 'reckless indifference' pertain to the employer's
knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its
awareness that it is engaging in discrimination. 67
Since the wording used by Congress to create a punitive damages
remedy in the 1991 Act was developed by the Supreme Court in Smith v.
Wade,6 s the Court analyzed the requirements of that case.69 In Smith, the
Supreme Court stated that "a jury may be permitted to assess punitive
damages in an action under § 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown
to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or
callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others."70 In
Kolstad, the Court adopted the subjective recklessness requirement of
Smith which required that "an employer must at least discriminate in the
face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law to be liable
in punitive damages." 7' The Court also stated that there are circumstances
when intentional discrimination will not give rise to punitive damages
liability under its malice or reckless indifference standard.72 For example,
an employer may be unaware of a federal prohibition or may think that the
discrimination is lawful. The underlying theory of discrimination also may
be novel or poorly recognized. In addition, an employer may reasonably
believe that its discrimination satisfies a bona fide occupational
qualification defense ("BFOQ") or another statutory exception.73
Justice O'Connor, joined by six other justices, rejected the District of
Columbia Circuit's en banc decision that eligibility for punitive damages
required a showing of egregious misconduct. 74 The Court stated that
"[w]hile egregious misconduct is evidence of the requisite mental state,
[the Civil Rights Act of 1991] does not limit plaintiffs to this form of
64. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994).
65. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534.
66. Id. at 535.

67. Id.
68. 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983) (providing the standard for an award of punitive damages).
69. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535-36.
70. Smith, 461 U.S. at 56.

71. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536 (interpreting the meaning of the terms "malice" and
"reckless indifference" in a Title VII action).
72. Id. at 536-37.

73. Id. at 537; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (describing the Title VII defense
"where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification").
74. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534-39.
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evidence, and the section does not require a showing of egregious or
outrageous discrimination independent of the employer's state of mind. '5
However, the Court recognized that "egregious or outrageous acts may
,, 76
serve as evidence supporting an inference of the requisite 'evil motive.
A slim five member majority of the Court held that a plaintiff must be
able to impute liability for punitive damages to a defendant.7' The Court
stated that "in the punitive damages context, an employer may not be
vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of
contrary to the employer's
managerial agents where these decisions are
'good-faith efforts to comply with Title VI".'' 7 s
The Court limited the applicability of the common law rules of agency
in Title VII cases. 79 The common law had long recognized agency
principles that limited vicarious liability for punitive damages awards.80
The Kolstad decision placed additional limitations on the awarding of
punitive damages. The Court held that if the acts of an employee were
contrary to the employer's good faith efforts to comply with Title VII, an

75. Id. at 535 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 538. The Court emphasized that "the reprehensible character of the conduct is
not generally considered apart from the requisite state of mind." Id.
77. Id. at 545.
78. Id. (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (Tatel, J., dissenting)).
The Court addressed this issue even though it was not briefed by either party. Id. at 553
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued that this issue was integral to the
decision, stating that "[t]his issue is intimately bound up with the preceding discussion on
the evidentiary showing necessary to qualify for a punitive award, and it is easily subsumed
within the question on which we granted certiorari." Id. at 540. However, the Court did not
apply the modified agency standards to Kolstad's case and instead vacated and remanded
the decision so that the lower courts could apply the standard articulated by the Court in
Kolstad. Id. at 546. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit remanded
the case back to the district court for further proceedings and provided the parties with an
opportunity to expand the record in summary judgment proceedings, and if summary
judgment was not granted, at trial. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, Nos. 96-7030, 96-7047,
1999 WL 825555, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 1999).
79. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 542-45.
80. Id. at 542-43. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY states that:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of an act by an agent if, but only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him,
or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in
the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or
approved the act.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 C (1958)).

PUNivE DAMAGES
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employer should not be liable for punitive damages for those acts.8'
The decision set out several policy reasons for modifying the common
law agency principles to conform with the goals of discrimination laws.
First, the Court emphasized that it is improper to award punitive damages
against an employer who is personally innocent and only vicariously
liable.82 Second, the Court emphasized that applying the common law rules
of agency, which allow an employer to be vicariously liable when
employees act in managerial capacities within the scope of employment,
would reduce the incentive for employers to implement anti-discrimination
programs." Third, the Court pointed out that the malice and reckless
indifference standard penalizes those employers who educate themselves
and their employees about Title VII's prohibitions. 4 The Court then
concluded that "[d]issuading employers from implementing programs or
policies to prevent discrimination in the workplace is directly contrary to
the purposes underlying Title VII," since the primary goal of the statute is
to prevent discrimination from occurring in the first place." The Court
remanded the case in order to provide Kolstad an opportunity to introduce
evidence to support the inference that the court can impute the required
mental state to the Association, which would allow Kolstad to receive
punitive damages. 86
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas concurred in part of the
decision and dissented in part of the decision. 87 Writing for the two
Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that he would adopt the
egregiousness test developed by Judge Randolph in his concurrence to the
District of Columbia Circuit Court's en banc majority decision.88 Chief
Justice Rehnquist agreed that agency principles placed a "significant
limitation", and in many cases a complete bar, on employer liability for
punitive damages.8 9 The Chief Justice's concurrence in part provided
Justice O'Connor with the five votes needed to limit the vicarious liability
of employers
when they have made a good faith effort to comply with Title
90
VII.

Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer also concurred in part
of the decision and dissented in part of the decision. 9' Justice Stevens,
81. Id. at 545.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 544.
Id. at 544-45.
Id.
Id. at 545.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 546.
Id. at 547.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 547.
Id.
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writing for the four Justices, agreed that the Court should not adopt the
District of Columbia Circuit Court's en banc egregiousness standard, but
disagreed with the portion of Justice O'Connor's opinion which held that
agency principles should limit employers' vicarious liability for punitive
damages. 92 The four-member dissent would have remanded the case for a
trial on the punitive damages issue without addressing the limitations of
vicarious liability regarding punitive damages under Title VII because the
issue was not briefed or raised by the parties. 9 Justice Stevens stated that it
was unnecessary to reach the issue of vicarious liability in this case because
a promotional decision by two9 4high-ranking members of a company is a
"quintessential 'company act.'
In Kolstad, the Supreme Court articulated a two-part standard for
punitive damages that likely will expand the availability of punitive
damages to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases. Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer--the four justices on the left of the
Court-joined Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy in rejecting the
theory that plaintiffs must show egregious conduct, and emphasized that
under the 1991 Act, plaintiffs need only show that an employer had a
culpable state of mind.95 However, against the strong dissent of Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, the majority circumscribed the
vicarious liability of employers for punitive damages when the employer
can demonstrate that it has made a good faith effort to comply with Title
VII96

By only requiring a culpable state of mind and not an independent
showing of egregiousness, the Supreme Court made it easier for plaintiffs
to receive punitive damages. An analysis of the employer's state of mind
in order to determine whether the employer knew that it might have been
acting in violation of federal law likely will be a very fact-intensive inquiry
that will often preclude summary judgment on the issue of punitive
damages.97 However, in its second holding, the Supreme Court attempted
to restrict a plaintiff's opportunity to receive punitive damages by
92. Id. at 547-53.
93. Id. at 552-53.
94. Id. at 552 (citations omitted); see also Dodoo v. Seagate Tech., Inc., No. 99-6352,
2000 WL 1843245, at *7 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 2000) (finding Kolstad's agency analysis
inapplicable in a failure to promote case because "its agency principles do not bear on the
situation here, where punitive damages are imposed on the basis of direct liability").
95. Id. at 551.
96. Id. at 528.
97. See David Borgen, Major Recent Developments in Employment Law from the
Perspective of a Plaintiffs' Attorney, 614 PRAc. L. INST. LmG. & ADMIN. PRAC. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 151, 163 (1999). The Supreme Court has addressed the difficulty of
granting summary judgment when a court must analyze the actor's state of mind within the
official immunity context. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982) (stating that
"questions of subjective intent so rarely can be decided by summary judgment").
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providing a defendant with the ability to demonstrate that it made a good
faith effort to comply with Title VII. 9s Although it seemed as though the
Court's good faith effort defense might affect plaintiffs' opportunities to
obtain punitive damages, thus far the courts have looked beyond whether
an employer had a grievance procedure or an anti-discrimination policy,
and analyzed whether these mechanisms were actually utilized, and
whether they were effective in addressing the discrimination and
harassment that occurred. Therefore, Kolstad has not limited plaintiffs'
opportunities for punitive damages, as many commentators suggested it
would.
M. CASES ANALYZED UNDER THE KOLSTAD STANDARD

A.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Although many commentators argued that the restrictions the Supreme
Court placed on punitive damages would limit employer damages, most
courts that have applied this new standard continue to permit punitive
damage awards.99 This has certainly been the case in actions brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,'0° the district court
granted the defendant judgment as a matter of law on the issue of punitive
damages after the jury awarded the plaintiff $100,000 in punitive damages
and $19,000 in compensatory damages.'O The court then entered a verdict
for Deffenbaugh-Williams only on her compensatory damages claim.'0 2
Before the Supreme Court's ruling in Kolstad, the Fifth Circuit

98. Often a court's analysis of whether an employer has made a good faith effort to
comply with discrimination laws will be a fact-intensive inquiry which precludes summary

judgment. See Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 655 (lst Cir. 2000) (finding that
"[a]lIthough a written non-discrimination policy is one indication of an employer's efforts to

comply with Title VII," it was insufficient without a showing by the employer that it had
made an effort to implement the policy by creating "an active mechanism for renewing

employees' awareness of the policies through either specific education programs or periodic
re-dissemination or revision of their written materials").
99. See Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 604 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming the jury's
$25,000 punitive damages award in a Title VII and § 1983 sexual harassment case); Conner
v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int'l, Inc., 227 F.3d 179, 202 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming the lower
court's punitive damages award in a Title VII hostile environment case, but remanding the
award for remittitur because it was over the statutory maximum); Alexander v. Fulton
County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court's award of
punitive damages in a Title VII race discrimination action).
100. 188 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1999).
101. Id. at281.
102. Id.
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affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court, and
ordered remittitur of the punitive damages award to $75,000.103 When the
Fifth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, the court ordered additional
briefing and additional oral argument on the potential effect of the Supreme
Court's decision in Kolstad.1°4 Once Kolstad was decided, the Fifth Circuit
reinstated the prior panel opinion of the court, except for the punitive
damages issue, and remanded it for further consideration in light of
Kolstad.'0 5 The court allowed the parties, and invited the EEOC, to brief
the effect of Kolstad, specifically whether a new trial on punitive damages
was required.10 6 On remand, the court of appeals held that the Kolstad
decision did not require a new trial on the issue of punitive damages and
reduced the punitive damages award from $100,000 to $75,000.207
In Deffenbaugh-Williams, the plaintiff, a white woman, brought suit
under Title VII and § 1981 alleging that she had been discriminated against
because she was dating an African-American male.l"" DeffenbaughWilliams alleged that her district manager made remarks that she would
never be promoted because of her interracial relationship.' °9 Dale Gipson,
the plaintiff's supervisor, pursued a series of allegedly pretextual
disciplinary actions against the plaintiff and ultimately terminated her." 0
Since signs posted at Wal-Mart encouraged employees with grievances to
contact higher management, Deffenbaugh-Williams complained to regional
manager David Norman. 1' Although Norman told Deffenbaugh-Williams
that he would investigate the claim, he never contacted her about any
2
actions he took to resolve her complaint.'
In its analysis of whether the court should grant a new trial on punitive
damages, the Fifth Circuit examined the impact of the Kolstad case. The
court stated that when the law changes in "unanticipated ways" during the
course of an appeal, the Fifth Circuit usually will remand for a new trial to
provide the parties with both the benefit of the new law and a measure of
103. Id.; see also Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 598
(5th Cir. 1998) (applying the three-factor analysis developed by the Supreme Court in the
tort case of BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), as to the reasonableness of
punitive damages).
104. Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 281; see also Deffenbaugh-Williams v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 169 F.3d 215, 215 (5th Cir. 1999) (ordering additional oral argument).
105. Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 281; see also Deffenbaugh-Williams v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 182 F.3d 333, 333 (5th Cir. 1999) (reinstating the prior panel opinion
except as to the issue of punitive damages).
106. Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 281.
107. Id. at 280. The plaintiff stipulated to the reduced damages award. Id. at 281.
108. Id. at 280.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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fairness.' 3 However, in Deffenbaugh-Williams the court declined to
remand because "Kolstad's imputation holding [of punitive damages
liability to employers] was not such a sudden shift as to require, infairness,
giving Wal-Mart an opportunity to present additional evidence."' 4 The
Fifth Circuit emphasized the continuity between Kolstad and the prior law
of the circuit. The court also stated that the authorities on which Kolstad
relied "had been available long earlier [sic]." '" 5 After a close examination
of the standard established by the Supreme Court in Kolstad, the Fifth
Circuit reinstated its prior1 6 panel opinion and allowed the jury's punitive
damages verdict to stand.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion and holding in Deffenbaugh-Williams
illustrates that Kolstad has not dramatically changed and constricted a
plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. To the contrary, the court's decision
in Deffenbaugh-Williams to uphold the jury's decision to award punitive
damages shows that Kolstad has not heralded the end of employer
liability
17
for punitive damages in employment discrimination cases.'
In the Tenth Circuit case Knowlton v. Teltrust Phones, Inc.,"'s the
113. Id. at282.
114. Id. at 284 (emphasis added). Two Eighth Circuit cases arrived at the same
conclusion--that a new trial was not required on the issue of punitive damages, even though
the jury considered the issue before the Supreme Court's decision in Kolstad. See
Kimbrough v. Loma Linda Dev., Inc., 183 F.3d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming the
punitive damages award); Blackmon v. Pinkerton Sec. & Investigative Servs., 182 F.3d 629,
637 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on the
issue of punitive damages and remanding the case to the district court with instructions to
reinstate the jury's punitive damages award). But see Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson
Consumer Prod., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 514 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[a]lthough we
conclude that the evidence was unquestionably sufficient and that the form of the jury's
verdict properly supported a punitive damages award, we remand so that the district court
may apply the Supreme Court's decision in Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n" in order to allow
the defendant an opportunity to assert a good faith defense).
115. Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 283. The court cited several sources. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 219-37 (1958); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983);
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (citing the Court's discussion of
agency principles). The court also noted the application of punitive damages principles in
various § 1981 cases. Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 283-84.
116. Deffenbaugh-Williams, 188 F.3d at 286. However, the court also reinstated the
remittitur, which reduced the punitive damages jury award from $100,000 to $75,000. Id.
117. The Fifth Circuit has applied the Kolstad standard in two additional cases. One
upheld the punitive damage award and the other reversed the lower court's punitive
damages award. See Rubinstein v. Adm'r of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 406-07
(5th Cir. 2000) (upholding the lower court's award of punitive damages because the plaintiff
proved that the university's agent was motivated by malice or reckless indifference, and the
university had not presented evidence of good faith efforts to comply with Title VII);
Williams v. Trader Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 481, 487-88 (5th Cir. 2000) (reversing the lower
court's award of punitive damages because the employee who discriminated against the
plaintiff could not be considered a "managerial employee" under Kolstad).
118. 189 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Kolstad decision influenced the court to reverse a directed verdict for the
defendant that dismissed plaintiff's punitive damages claim."1 9 Plaintiff
Knowlton worked as a sales representative for the defendant when her
supervisor, Mark Neihart, began to sexually harass her. 120 Previously,
another employee had complained to management about Neihart's
harassing conduct.1 2 ' However, management was not responsive to that
122
complaint and Neihart continued to harass women in the workplace.
After plaintiff complained to management about Neihart's conduct, Neihart
was transferred to another position within the company.' 23 Since Knowlton
would still be forced to interact with Neihart in his new position, she
resigned and filed a complaint with both the EEOC and the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division. 2 4 After exhausting her administrative remedies,
plaintiff was awarded $75,000 in compensatory damages at trial.'25
However, Knowlton was unable to receive punitive damages because the
district court granted a directed verdict dismissing her punitive damages
claim. 12 6 The district court found that Knowlton had failed to prove
actual
127
malice or reckless indifference to her federally protected rights.
The Tenth Circuit, applying Kolstad, reversed and found that the
defendant's liability regarding punitive damages was an issue for the
jury. 12 The court asserted that "our previous cases are consistent with
Kolstad's admonition that malice or reckless indifference relates to the
employer's state of mind and not necessarily to its actions.' ' 129 The Tenth
Circuit stated that the lower court erred when it found that there was no
evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found the requisite
intent required under the 1991 Act to sustain a punitive damages claim. 30
The Knowlton court stated that the defendant was "unmistakably aware"
that Neihart's behavior was "rife with foul language, sexual innuendo, and
sexual advances which could reasonably be labeled as sexual
harassment.' 3' In addition, the court found that the defendant's transfer of
Neihart to another department, where Knowlton would remain in contact
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.at 1180.
Id.
Id. at 1186-87.
Id.
Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1181.
Id.
Id. at 1186.
Id.

128. Id. at 1187-88.
129. Id. at 1186 (citation omitted). Although the court did not explicitly address the
issue of vicarious liability, the court commented that the defendant did not act in good faith
to remedy the Title VII discrimination.
130. Id. at 1187.
131. Id.
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with him, was unresponsive. 1
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Knowlton illustrates that Kolstad will
not restrict the opportunity for plaintiffs to receive punitive damages, and
that it may even broaden the availability of punitive damages. 133 In
applying the Kolstad standard, the Tenth Circuit in Knowlton reversed the
district court's grant of a directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages
and remanded the issue of punitive damages to the district court to be
decided by a jury.14 Since the first part of the Kolstad analysis requires a
fact-intensive inquiry, the Knowlton court found that the issue of employer
intent was for a jury to decide.135 In addition, although the Tenth Circuit in
Knowlton did not explicitly apply Kolstad's good faith effort test, it made
clear that Teltrust Phones had not attempted in good faith to address
Knowlton's sexual harassment claim.
The Tenth Circuit analyzed what constitutes good faith compliance
with Title VII in Cadena v. The PacesetterCorp.136 Lynn Cadena sued her
former employer, alleging that she was sexually harassed by her
supervisor. 137 The defendant attempted to prove that it had acted in good
faith because it maintained a sexual harassment policy and trained its
employees to comply with Title VII. 138 In rejecting the defendant's
contention, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that the "good-faith-compliance
standard requires the employer to make 'good faith efforts to enforce an
antidiscrimination policy.""' .3 9 Therefore, even though a defendant in a
Title VII discrimination suit "maintains on paper a strong nondiscrimination policy and makes good faith efforts to educate its employees
about that policy and Title VII, a plaintiff may still recover punitive
damages if she demonstrates the employer failed to adequately address
Title VII violations of which it was aware."' 4 Since Cadena had presented

132. Id.
133. In Powell v. COBE Lab., Inc., No. 98-1350, 98-1363, 2000 WL 235241, at *1 (10th
Cir. Mar. 2, 2000), the Tenth Circuit also broadened the scope of punitive damages in Title
VII cases. After ajury awarded the plaintiff $200,000 in punitive damages, the district court
granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and struck the punitive damages
award. Id. at *2. The Tenth Circuit then vacated the district court's decision and remanded
it for consideration in light of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Kolstad. Id. at *3.
134. Knowlton, 189 F.3d at 1186.
135. The Tenth Circuit has also applied the first prong of the Supreme Court's Kolstad
test in Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Serv., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 2000)
(stating that malice or reckless indifference refers to an employer's knowledge that it may
be acting in violation of federal law).
136. 224 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2000).
137. Id. at 1207.
138. Id. at 1210.
139. Id. (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999) (emphasis
added)).
140. Id.
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evidence demonstrating that the defendant knew about the harassing
conduct and failed to take action to end it, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
lower court's award of $300,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 4'
In implementing Kolstad's good faith effort defense, the Tenth Circuit
looked beyond the existence of an anti-discrimination policy to determine
whether that policy effectively functioned as a means of eliminating
discrimination in the workplace.' 42
In EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, InC., 14 3 the Tenth Circuit again
determined that a district court should not have dismissed a plaintiff's
punitive damages claim. 144 The case was brought by the EEOC on behalf
of Christa Gurule, a former Wal-Mart employee who claimed that
4
defendant subjected her to a hostile environment and sexual harassment.1 1
The trial court decided as a matter of law that the EEOC was not entitled to
punitive damages under the 1991 Act. 46 The Tenth Circuit remanded the
case for an analysis in light of Kolstad because the record was "not
147
sufficient to decide the issues of intent and agency laid out in Kolstad."'
The court extensively quoted the test established by the Supreme Court in
Kolstad.1 4s The Tenth Circuit suggested that the EEOC might have enough
141. Id. at 1216.
142. Several other circuits have also held that the mere existence of an antidiscrimination policy does not satisfy the good faith effort defense set forth in Kolstad. See
Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1010 (8th Cir. 2000) (affirming the lower court's
punitive damages award and holding that the mere existence of a sexual harassment policy:
does not suffice, as a matter of law, to establish 'good faith efforts' in the face
of substantial evidence that the company 'minimized' [plaintiff's) complaints;
performed a cursory investigation which focused upon [plaintiffs]
performance, rather than [her manager's] conduct; and forced [plaintiff] to
resign while imposing no discipline upon [her supervisor] for his behavior.
(quoting Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir.
1999))); Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 206 F.3d 431, 446 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming
the lower court's award of punitive damages and holding that "an employer's institution of a
written policy against race discrimination" is not "automatically a bar to the imposition of
punitive damages").
143. Nos. 97-2229, 97-2252, 1999 WL 1032963, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999).
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id. at *1.
146. Id. at *2.
147. Id. at *4.
148. The court stated that a plaintiff must show:
(1) the employer acted with malice or reckless indifference, a state of mind
which can be shown with evidence that the employer discriminated against the
employee with the knowledge that it might be violating federal law; (2) an
employee serving in a managerial capacity committed the wrong; (3) the
managerial agent was acting in the scope of employment; and (4) the agent's
action was not contrary to the employer's good-faith efforts to comply with
Title VII.
Id. at *3 (citing Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. 526,535-536,544 (1999)).
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evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to punitive damages. 49
The Knowlton, Cadena, and Wal-Mart cases illustrate that Kolstad has
not erected a barrier to plaintiffs obtaining punitive damages. On the
contrary, the Supreme Court's decision provided an opportunity for the
courts to both remand the district courts' decisions and allow the plaintiffs
a trial on the issue of punitive damages. One commentator has suggested
that this is the impact Kolstad will have on future employment
discrimination cases. 50 David Borgen argues that Kolstad's subjective
intent test will make the district court's inquiry very fact-intensive, thus
making it more difficult for courts to grant summary judgment for
defendants on the issue of punitive damages.' 5' Since analyzing whether a
defendant had a culpable state of mind is subjective and fact-based,
defendants will likely lose summary judgment on the issue of punitive
damages. The Kolstad case might surprise the legal community by
allowing more, rather than fewer, plaintiffs to receive punitive damages for
discrimination in the workplace.
The Sixth Circuit utilized the Kolstad standard and upheld a jury
award of punitive damages in EEOC v. EMC Corp. of Massachusetts.152 In
EMC, the EEOC brought a Title VII gender discrimination suit on behalf of
Patricia Boyton.' 53 Even though Boyton, a sales representative, had
performed better than two male sales representatives in her office, the area
manager instructed the supervisor to "put her on a program to be
terminated."'15 4 When she was terminated, Boyton was ranked first among
thirty-four salespeople nationwide in revenue. 155 At trial, the jury found
EMC liable for gender discrimination and awarded plaintiff $300,000 in
punitive damages. 156 The Sixth Circuit, applying the Kolstad standard,
upheld the award of punitive damages. The court stated that firing Boyton
while continuing to employ male workers who had performed more poorly
showed "reckless disregard for [Boyton's] right to be free from
discrimination based on gender.' ' 157 Similar to the other circuits that have
applied the Kolstad standard, the Sixth Circuit did not restrict the
availability of punitive damages. Even though the EEOC could not
definitively prove that EMC possessed the requisite mental state, the court
reviewed EMC's actions and determined that, under Kolstad, punitive

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at *4.
See Borgen, supra note 97, at 163.
Id.
No. 98-1517, 2000 WL 191819, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 8,2000).
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *7.
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damages could be awarded." 8
B.

Section 1983

Kolstad also has been applied to another civil rights statute, § 1983.'
In Smith v. Pepersack,16 the plaintiff brought an action against former
sheriff Robert Pepersack and former undersheriff J. Patrick Ogle of Anne
Arundel County, Maryland as well as the county itself, alleging both
gender discrimination and sexual harassment.' 61 Smith alleged that the
defendants discriminated against her by denying her a promotion because
of gender and by sexually harassing her.162 The district court dismissed the
claims against the county, and the jury awarded plaintiff $5,100 in
compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages against Pepersack
and Ogle. 63 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury's award under Kolstad.
The court stated that, "because the jury's finding of a constitutional
violation under § 1983 necessarily encompasses a finding of intentional
discrimination, Smith need not also demonstrate, as defendants suggest,
that the conduct was particularly egregious or malicious."' 64 The Fourth
Circuit held that because Smith presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the
standard under the 1991 Act, it would uphold the jury's award of punitive
damages. 165
In Smith, the Fourth Circuit applied the Kolstad standard to uphold the
jury's award of punitive damages. In fact, the Supreme Court's decision in
158. In another Title VII case, the Sixth Circuit reversed a district court's grant of a Rule
50(b) motion on a jury's punitive damages award and remanded the case for reconsideration
of the award. The jury had awarded the plaintiff $1.1 million, of which $300,000 were
punitive damages. See Patton v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Nos. 97-2310, 98-1621, 98-1004,
2000 WL 1681017, at *7 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000).
159. Section 1983 was enacted in 1871 to protect the newly emancipated slaves from
attempts by state officials to restrict their rights. Section 1983 states that:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999).
160. No. 98-1842, 98-1843, 1999 WL 760218 (4th Cir. Sept. 24, 1999).
161. Id. at*1.
162. Id.
163. Id. at *3.
164. Id. at *5. Before Kolstad, the Fourth Circuit required an independent showing of
malice in order to award punitive damages. See Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158
F.3d 742, 765-66 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated by, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999) (stating that punitive
damages are recoverable under Title VII only for conduct that exhibits malice, an evil
motive, recklessness, or callous indifference to a federally protected right).
165. Smith, 1999 WL 760218, at *5.
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Kolstad made punitive damages easier to receive in the Fourth Circuit by
removing the previous requirement that plaintiffs need to prove
independent egregious conduct separate from the defendants' intentional
discrimination.
However, the First Circuit has applied Kolstad to uphold a denial of
punitive damages. In lacobucci v. Boulter,166 the plaintiff was arrested by
the defendant after he attempted to videotape a meeting of the Pembroke
Historic District Commission. 67 The district court conducted a trial on
plaintiff's claims under both § 1983 alleging false arrest and excessive
16
1
force, and state law, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The jury found for the plaintiff on his false arrest claim and awarded him
169
$75,000 in compensatory damages and $135,000 in punitive damages.
The district court struck down the jury's award of punitive damages and the
First Circuit affirmed. 70 The court discussed Kolstad and reasoned that the
plaintiff in this case did171not prove that the defendant arrested him because
of an improper motive.
Although the First Circuit applied Kolstad to uphold a denial of
punitive damages, the Iacobucci case likely will not have a substantial
effect on the interpretation of Kolstad. The context of that case is very
different from most cases brought under federal anti-discrimination law.
As the First Circuit's decision illustrated, it is extremely difficult to prove
intent in a false arrest case. In lacobucci, the defendant decided to arrest
the plaintiff quickly, which did not provide a sufficient opportunity to
prove evidence of intent. In contrast, evidence of intent is often readily
available in employment discrimination cases. Cases brought under Title
VII, § 1981, or § 1983 for workplace discrimination usually involve
allegations that the defendant either discriminated against plaintiff over a
period of time or did not effectively prevent or remedy discrimination that
a plaintiff faced. Various decisions made by employers are often
documented and there is usually evidence of how an individual's complaint
was handled and to what degree an anti-discrimination policy has been
implemented. For example, in a Title VII case, a defendant typically
makes numerous decisions over the course of several months or years from
which a judge or jury may be able to infer intent. Therefore, because the
intent analysis in Iacobucci was more difficult and the available evidence
166. 193 F.3d. 14, 26 (1st Cir. 1999).
167. Id. at 17-18.
168. Id. at 18.
169. Id.
170. Id. at26.
171. Id. at 26-27. The court held that the plaintiff needed to provide evidence that
defendant "determined to effectuate the arrest knowing that he lacked probable cause to do
so, or, at least, with conscious indifference to the possibility that he lacked probable cause."
Id. at 26.
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was much more limited than the evidence in employment discrimination
cases, the First Circuit's decision will have a minimal impact on how the
Kolstad standard is applied in employment discrimination cases.
C. Americans with DisabilitiesAct
The courts of appeals have examined Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") cases under the Kolstad standard.1 72 The Eighth Circuit has
applied the Kolstad standard to expand the opportunity for plaintiffs in73
ADA cases to receive punitive damages. In Otting v. J.C. Penney Co.,
defendant J.C. Penney Co. terminated plaintiff from her sales position
because, as a result of her epilepsy, she could not use a ladder.' 74 Although
the jury awarded Otting both compensatory and punitive damages, the
district court granted defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law
on plaintiffs $100,000 punitive damages award. 175 The Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law and
reinstated the jury's punitive damages award. 176 The court of appeals found
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of malice or reckless
indifference, including defendant's policy that prevented employees with
restrictions from returning to work, as well as its failure to consider that
Otting could return to work even with her ladder-climbing restriction. 77 In
addition, the defendant refused to consider transferring Otting after she
specifically suggested this possibility at her termination meeting.178 The
store manager testified at trial that he was aware of the obligation under
federal law to accommodate workers with disabilities. 79 Therefore,
according to the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiff had proven that defendant
acted with malice or reckless indifference. 80 The Eighth Circuit's
broadening of punitive damages liability illustrates that, in many instances,
Kolstad has enlarged, rather than restricted, the availability of punitive
damages.' 8 '
172. See Marcano-Rivera v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 232 F.3d 245 (lst Cir. 2000); Otting v.
J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2000); Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc., 214
F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2000); Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365 (7th Cir. 2000); EEOC
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999).
173. 223 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2000).
174. Id. at711.
175. Id. at 708.
176. Id. at712.
177. Id. at711-12.
178. Id. at712.
179. Id. at711-12.
180. Id. at712.
181. However, as Kolstad makes clear, when a theory of discrimination is novel or
otherwise poorly recognized, a defendant's intentional discrimination will not give rise to
punitive damages because the defendant did not act with the requisite malice or reckless
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182

In EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the Tenth Circuit upheld a lower
court's grant of punitive damages in an ADA case.183 The plaintiff,
Eduardo Amaro, was hired by Wal-Mart with the knowledge that he was
hearing-impaired and would need an interpreter in certain circumstances,
including training sessions and meetings.' 84 After working at Wal-Mart for
almost two years, Amaro attended a mandatory training session that
required the viewing of a videotape.18 5 Amaro left the training session
because the video was not close-captioned and the defendant did not
provide an interpreter.186 Although Amaro's supervisor requested that he
return to watch the video, he refused.187 The next day Amaro was
transferred to the janitorial department.' When he met with his supervisor
and the store manager, without an interpreter, Amaro was informed that the
transfer was due to payroll reductions and that janitorial duties required less
communication.8 9 Amaro believed that the transfer was a demotion and
did not want to accept the -downward move. 90 He requested an interpreter
to help explain the transfer and a week later the store manager brought an
interpreter to facilitate discussion.' 9' After Amaro refused the transfer, he
was fired. 92 The EEOC brought a complaint on behalf of Amaro, alleging
disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA. 193 Amaro
intervened, and asserted ADA claims as well.' 94 At trial, the jury returned a
and
verdict for Amaro, awarding him $3,527.79 in compensatory damages
96
195
verdict.
the
appealed
Defendant
damages.
punitive
in
$75,000
The court of appeals analyzed whether the trial court's award of
punitive damages should be affirmed under the Kolstad standard. 197 The

indifference. The Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court's award of punitive damages in
such a case. Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 375-76 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that
the employer's failure to change plaintiff's shift because she was suffering from depression
"amounted to negligence because it misunderstood [plaintiff's] difficulties, did not regard
her condition a disability and neglected to pursue [plaintiff] in developing an alternative
accommodation").
182. 187 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1999).
183. Id. at 1250-51.
184. Id. at 1243.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1244.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1246.
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court determined that the evidence on record was "sufficient to resolve the
questions of intent and agency laid out in Kolstad."' g The defendant
argued that Wal-Mart's preparation and dissemination of an ADA
compliance manual should shield it from punitive damages liability, even
though Amaro's supervisors failed to follow the manual.' 99
The Tenth Circuit inferred from the evidence provided at trial that the
jury could have found that the defendant "intentionally discriminated
against Amaro in the face of a perceived risk that its action would violate
federal law., 200 The court also held that punitive damages were permitted
under the modified agency principles established in Kolstad.2° 1 The Tenth
Circuit found that Amaro's supervisor and the store manager had acted
within the scope of their employment when they terminated Amaro. 0 2 The
court also emphasized that Wal-Mart's written policy alone did not
constitute a good faith effort to comply with the ADA.20 3 Therefore, the
204
court of appeals affirmed the district court's award of punitive damages.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Wal-Mart illustrates that the standard
articulated by the Supreme Court in Kolstad will not likely limit the
availability of punitive damages under the ADA. In Wal-Mart, the Tenth
Circuit applied the Kolstad standard and upheld a jury award of punitive
damages. The court applied the good faith effort defense by examining not
only whether Wal-Mart had a written policy against discrimination, but
also whether the defendant had actually attempted to "educate its
employees about the ADA's prohibitions., 20 5 By engaging in this detailed
analysis of company procedure, the court went beyond general
pronouncements of anti-discrimination and reviewed Wal-Mart's actual
company practice. When courts engage in this type of detailed analysis
they will be more likely to find that an employer has not acted in good faith
and, therefore, more willing to allow punitive damages awards.
In two courts of appeals cases upholding the district courts' refusals to
award punitive damages, the Kolstad standard probably had little impact on
the decisions. In Marcano-Rivera,0 6 the plaintiff brought suit under the
ADA, alleging that her employer failed to provide reasonable

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1249.
202. Id. at 1248.

203. Id. The court stated that "Wal-Mart certainly had a written policy against
discrimination, but that alone is not enough. Our review of the record leaves us
unconvinced that Wal-Mart made a good faith effort to educate its employees about the
ADA's prohibitions." Id. at 1248-49.
204. Id. at 1249.
205. Id. at 1248-49.
206. 232 F.3d 245 (1st Cir. 2000).
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accommodations for her disability. 20 7 The plaintiff used a wheelchair for
20 8
mobility because both of her legs had been amputated earlier in her life*
After she was reassigned to several departments due to job restructuring,
plaintiff's job was eliminated as part of a reduction in force.2° The First
Circuit upheld the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on punitive
damages. 210 The court held that plaintiff failed to present any evidence of
malice or reckless indifference.21 ' In addition, the First Circuit found that
the defendant had made good faith efforts to comply with the ADA by
instituting policies prohibiting disability discrimination and training
employees to ensure equal treatment. 212
Similar to the First Circuit's decision in Marcano-Rivera,the Second
Circuit also upheld a district court's refusal to award punitive damages in
Weissman v. Dawn Joy Fashions, Inc.213 In Weissman, the plaintiff was
terminated two weeks after he suffered a heart attack.21 4 The plaintiff
presented evidence that his termination was due to his heart attack, while
the defendant claimed that the plaintiff was a poor worker and was
scheduled to be terminated regardless of his health.21 5 Although a jury
awarded the plaintiff $150,000 in punitive damages, the district court
granted the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law and
reversed the jury's punitive damages award.216 The Second Circuit found
that the defendant could not have acted with reckless disregard of
Weissman's federal civil rights, because prior to plaintiffs heart attack,
defendant had contacted its attorneys regarding plaintiffs possible
termination.1 7
Although the First Circuit in Marcano-Rivera and the Second Circuit
in Weissman applied the Kolstad standard to deny an award of punitive
damages, the decisions in both of those cases would likely have been the
same under a pre-Kolstad analysis. Before Kolstad, several courts of
appeals required a showing of egregious conduct independent from the
defendant's malice. In Marcano-Rivera and Weissman, neither plaintiff
even presented evidence of malice, a threshold much lower than the
showing of egregiousness required by many circuits prior to Kolstad.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 253-54.
Id. at 254.
214 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 227-28.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 236.
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D. PregnancyDiscriminationAct
The 1991 Act offers women who bring actions under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act the possibility of receiving a punitive damages
award.21 8 The courts of appeals have applied the Kolstad standard in the
context of pregnancy discrimination to expand the opportunity for plaintiffs
219
to receive punitive damages. In EEOC v. W & 0, Inc., the Eleventh
The defendant
Circuit affirmed the jury's award of punitive damages.
operated a restaurant which had a policy that prohibited waitresses past
their fifth month of pregnancy from waiting tables.221 The policy required
that these pregnant waitresses either suspend working or work as cashiers
or hostesses, positions that paid significantly less than waiting tables. 2
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a jury
to find that the defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference to the
pregnant workers' rights. 223 In addition, the court found that each
aggrieved employee represented by the EEOC in the Title VII action could
receive up to the statutory cap in damages without separately filing suit or
intervening in the EEOC's action. 2 4
The Fifth Circuit also has interpreted the Kolstad standard to allow
more opportunities for plaintiffs to receive punitive damages under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. In Hardin v. Caterpillar,Inc.,223 the Fifth
Circuit vacated the verdict of the lower court and remanded for
reconsideration the issue of whether punitive damages should be submitted
to the jury.226 Before the Supreme Court's decision in Kolstad, the district
227
court had declined to submit the punitive damage issue to the jury.
However, the Fifth Circuit held that under the Supreme Court's new
standard articulated in Kolstad, "a reasonable juror could conclude that the
representatives were either lying or consciously indifferent to the...
legality of their acts., 22' However, the court was unwilling to remand for a
new trial only on the issue of punitive damages. 22 9 Thus, the court provided
the plaintiff with the opportunity to accept the damages awarded at the first
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000) (including pregnancy in Title VII's definition of sex
discrimination); Id. § 1981a.
219. 213 F.3d 600 (11th Cir. 2000).
220. Id. at 614.
221. Id. at 607.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 612.
224. Id. at 614.
225. 227 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2000).
226. Id. at 273.
227. Id. at 269.
228. Id. at 270-7 1.
229. Id. at 272 (stating "[w]e are persuaded of the practical inseparability of the issues of
intent, of damages for emotional injury, and of punitive damages in this case").
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trial or to retry the whole case in the hope that her award, including the
potential punitive damages, would increase 0 Although the Fifth Circuit's
application of Kolstad in this case does not definitely provide plaintiff with
a larger recovery, it at least provides her with an opportunity that she did
not have prior to Kolstad--the opportunity to receive punitive damages.
Both the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hardin and the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in W & 0 apply the Kolstad standard to increase the chances of
receiving punitive damages in cases brought under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.
E.

FairHousing Act

The Fair Housing Amendments Act provides victims of
discriminatory housing practices with an opportunity to receive punitive
damages. 31 The Third and Eighth Circuits have applied the Kolstad
standard to broaden the opportunity for punitive damages under the Fair
Housing Amendments Act. In Alexander v. Riga,232 the plaintiffs brought
suit under both the Fair Housing Amendments Act and § 1981, alleging
that the defendants denied them rental housing on the basis of race.233
Plaintiffs presented evidence that the defendants did not return phone calls
of African-Americans inquiring about the apartment or informed them that
the apartment was already rented.? 4 In addition, the plaintiffs showed that
the defendants not only returned phone calls of white applicants but
provided them with tours of the apartment. 35 The jury found that the
defendants had discriminated against the plaintiffs, but it failed to award
any compensatory damages. 236 After the jury's decision on liability, the
district court declined to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury 7
The Third Circuit found that the jury's determination that the plaintiffs had
been discriminated against "necessarily encompasse[d] a finding of
intentional discrimination," which satisfied the malice or reckless
indifference requirement of Kolstad.2 3s The Third Circuit then reversed the
district court and remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of punitive

230. Id. at 273.
231. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (1994).
232. 208 F.3d 419,431 (3d Cir. 2000).
233. Id. at 423.
234. Id. at 424.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 424-25.
237. Id. at 425.
238. Id. at 431 (stating that "[r]ecklessness and malice may be inferred when a manager
responsible for showing and renting apartments repeatedly refuses to deal with AfricanAmericans about the apartment and misrepresents the apartment's availability").
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damages.239
In Badami v. Flood,240 the Eighth Circuit also remanded a case for a
new trial on the issue of punitive damages where the plaintiffs alleged that
they were discriminated against by a realtor. 241 The Badami family brought
suit under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, asserting that the
defendants' real estate company and brokers discriminated against them
because of the size of their family.242 The plaintiffs introduced evidence
illustrating that the defendants refused to assist plaintiffs in finding rental
housing. Although the plaintiffs suggested several homes, the defendants
informed plaintiffs that they had no properties suitable for the family's
size.243 The district court refused to submit the punitive damages claim to
the jury. The Eighth Circuit held that since the Kolstad standard applied to
cases brought under the Fair Housing Amendments Act, the district court
erred in refusing to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury. 244 The
court found that the defendants falsely informed plaintiffs that a property
had been rented, when, in fact, it had not.24' In addition, the defendants had
managed property for several years and testified that they were aware that
the Fair Housing Act prohibited discrimination in rental housing on the
basis of family size.246 Just as the Third Circuit had in Alexander, the
Eighth Circuit remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of punitive
damages. 247 The Third and Eighth Circuits both have applied the Kolstad
standard to broaden plaintiffs' opportunities to receive punitive damages in
Fair Housing Amendments Act discrimination cases.
IV. CONCLUSION

As these cases have illustrated, the Kolstad standard has done little to
reduce punitive damage awards in employment discrimination cases. In
fact, contrary to the predictions of various commentators, the Supreme
Court's decision in Kolstad is likely to have the opposite effect. The first
part of the Kolstad decision abrogated the egregiousness requirement that
several circuits had previously adopted, and instituted a less strenuous
intent standard that likely will permit many more claims of punitive
damages to survive pretrial motions, and thus be tried to juries. Regarding
239. Id. at 435.
240. 214 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2000).
241. Id. at 997 (remanding the case to the district court because it erred in failing to
submit the punitive damages claim to the jury).
242. Id. at 995.
243. Id. at 997.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 996.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 999.
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the second part of the decision, it is still unclear exactly what impact the
good faith standard will have on the availability of punitive damages. If
courts apply the good faith standard and review the employer's actual
employment practices, rather than relying on the mere articulation of an
anti-discrimination policy, the good faith standard will increase the
opportunity for punitive damages in employment discrimination cases. An
analysis of the cases applying the Kolstad standard illustrates that the
Supreme Court's decision has created more continuity than change and
more opportunity than limitation for plaintiffs to be awarded punitive
damages.

